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Abstract
We obtain explicitly the optimal path of prices for a monopolist oper-
ating in a network industry during a ﬁnite number of periods. We describe
this optimal path as a function of network intensity and horizon length
and show that the prices are increasing in time and that, for very low
network intensity, or very high horizon length, the monopolist will oﬀer
the good at zero price in the initial period.
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In this paper we analyze the pricing decision of a monopolist who sells a good
subject to network externalities for a ﬁnite number of periods. We consider
that the network takes one period of time to be constituted so that consumers
derive utility in each period from the volume of past sales (see Rohlfs (1974),
Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1994) and Farrell and Saloner (1985)). This type of
network externalities can be found when the quality of the good depends on
some “word of mouth” or “learning by doing” process, according to the termi-
nology in Bensaid and Lesne (1996). Early consumers allow ﬁrms to improve
their product, or to oﬀer better services and assistance in later periods, which
increases the beneﬁt of consuming the good for later users. Our analysis is,
in particular, appropriate for reputation goods (see Rogerson (1982)), or goods
which require a learning period. For instance, consider the market for a repu-
tation good when reputation increases with the size of its market. The initial
buyers of such a good spread information about how to use it and enjoy its con-
sumption. The group of consumers who buy the good initially can be viewed
as a network, improving the utility of its potential consumers and thereby the
potential proﬁts opportunities of the ﬁrm. This is the case of several products
resulting from recent innovation, and whose characteristics can only be revealed
by direct consumption. Also for many goods, the size of the initial network of
buyers determines the availability of complementary services the seller would
be willing to develop around the variant which is initially supplied. Examples
are: a bank and the number of branches which increases with the number of
its customers, a new machine and the number of its components when they are
available to subsequent buyers, like in the case of a computer whose number
of compatible programs increases with the number of its initial buyers. Notice
however that such product improvements or reputation eﬀects need some period
of time to be ﬁnalized, creating a time lag between the creation of the network,
and its eﬀect on the utility of subsequent buyers. This structure of preferences
implies that consumers always consider past consumers’ decisions before decid-
1ing to acquire the good or not. Consequently, the monopolist’s pricing decision
must consist in an intertemporal strategy: the price chosen in early periods
inﬂuences future sales and proﬁts.
In this note we uncover the monopolist’s optimal strategy and study how it
depends on the intensity of the preference for the network and on the horizon’s
length. In initial periods, the network eﬀect is mild and thus the surplus that
the monopolist could extract from the consumers by setting the instantaneous
monopoly price is low. On the contrary, setting a lower price attracts consumers
and increases the demand in future periods. The incentive to set low prices is,
nevertheless decreasing in time because the closer the horizon, the weaker the
interest of increasing further future demand. As a consequence, we ﬁrst observe
that the path of optimal prices is increasing through time. We also observe that
this path of prices approaches the sequence of instantaneous monopoly prices
corresponding to the sequence of accumulated demands, while being exactly
equal to this monopoly price in the last period.
Furthermore,for large values of network intensity, we show that the monopo-
list chooses initial prices to be zero, indicating that he would even set a negative
price if this would be admissible. We also show that, in this context, the monop-
olist selects a path of prices which increases through time, and that this path is
steeper than when the network intensity is weaker.
The initial zero price phenomenon is frequently observed. Banks usually
oﬀer low rates for new users, software is usually oﬀered at very low price (or,
even, given for free) in initial periods (whereas updates are expansive); similarly,
phone companies or network providers have low price deals for new adherents
(See Ackere and Reyniers (1995)). In this note, we provide a necessary and
suﬃcient condition under which the initial price is zero, implying that the seller
has interest in oﬀering free sample of the good in the ﬁrst period. To the best
of our knowledge, this condition has not been discussed so far in the literature.
Our note relates to previous literature on the pricing of durable goods and
experience goods. In particular, Cabral et al. (1999) study monopoly pricing in
a network industry and conclude that introductory pricing occurs if consumers
2are price takers, if there is incomplete information about demand or asymmetric
information about cost. We show that introductory pricing occurs in a setup
where information is complete and symmetric. Clarke et al. (1982) discuss,
within a continuous time framework, the consequences on monopoly pricing of
experience eﬀects in demand. They are also led to the conclusion that the path
of prices should be increasing through time. Dhebar and Oren (1985,1986),
analyzing linear and nonlinear pricing strategies for the monopolist, also con-
clude that his proﬁt margins should be increasing. Our note contributes to
this discussion by providing explicitly the optimal path of prices. We also ob-
tain comparative statics results related to the length of the horizon and to the
intensity of the network.
2 The model and results
Consider a proﬁt maximizing monopolist that sells a durable good at constant
average cost set to zero. The monopolist will be active in the market for T
periods.
At each period t,t =1 ,...,T,a new cohort of consumers enters the market.
Consumers value the good for its intrinsic utility and for the network beneﬁts
that it entails. The more consumers buy the good the higher is its value for each
individual. Consumers are diﬀerentiated according to their stand alone value.
They are distributed uniformly in [0,1] by increasing order of intrinsic valuation
for the good.
The demand for the good at time t, is denoted by Dt(pt,p t−1,...,p1). The
utility of agent v at time t is given by:
ut (v;pt−1,...,p1)=v + α
t  
j=1
Dt−j (pt−j,...,p1); (1)
The parameter α, α > 0, measures the intensity of the network eﬀect.
First, we derive the demand function for the product in each period t, t =
1,...,T. Since the consumer, in her decision problem at period t, only considers
3the network constituted in the past periods, the functional form of demand in
each period is independent of the subsequent periods and depends only on prices
pτ, τ =1 ,...t. Let us start with T = 2. The demand at period 1 is given by:
D1(p1)=1− p1,1 ≥ p1 ≥ 0. (2)
In period 2, taking into account the network eﬀect created in period 1, we
identify the consumer   v who is indiﬀerent between buying the product and not
buying in period 2 by the condition
v + α(1 − p1) − p2 =0 ,
namely,   v = p2 − α(1 − p1). Thus, demand in period 2 is given by:
D2(p2,p 1)=1− p2 + α(1 − p1). (3)
Likewise, in period 3 and taking into account the network eﬀect in periods
1 and 2, the consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying the product and not
buying in period 3, denote it by     v,is given by the condition
v + α(1 − p1 +1− p2 + α(1 − p1)) − p3 =0 ,
namely,     v = p3 −α(1−p1 +1−p2 +α(1 − p1)). Thus, the demand in period 3
obtains as
D3 (p3,p 2,p 1)=1− p3 + α(1 − p1 +1− p2 + α(1 − p1)).
Proceeding by induction, it is easy to see that the demand in period t ≤ T
obtains as
Dt(pt,...,p1) = (1 + α)
t−1 − α
t  
j=2
(1 + α)
t−j pj−1 − pt.
Notice that, when α>1, the demand might react with more intensity to pre-
vious prices, p2 and p1, than to current price. This is so because, under this
condition, lower initial prices increase the value of the good for subsequent users.
4On the contrary, for α<1, the eﬀect of initially low prices tends to vanish with
time. An alternative expression for the demand obtains as
Dt(pt,...,p1)=1− pt + α
t  
j=1
Dt−j.
The demand in period t is a linear decreasing function of pt with the constant
term increasing in t. All the above expressions for demands at period t must of
course satisfy the fact that demand can never exceed 1.
The total proﬁt function with horizon T writes as:
Π(T;pT,...,p1)=
T  
k=1
pkDk
=
T  
k=1
pk

(1 + α)
k−1 − α
k  
j=2
(1 + α)
k−j pj−1 − pk

.
3 “Weak” network intensity
Consider ﬁrst that the condition
α<
1
T − 1
(C1)
is satisﬁed by the parameters of the model.
Proposition 1 Under C.1, the set of values given by
pt (T)=
1 − (T − t)α
2 − (T − 1)α
,t =1 ,...,T (4)
constitutes the unique solution to the monopolist’s proﬁt maximization problem.
Proof. We diﬀerentiate Π(T;pT,...,p1) with respect to p1,...,pT and, by the
ﬁrst order necessary conditions for an interior maximum, we get a system of T
equations deﬁned by
∂Π(T;pT,...,p1)
∂ps
=0 ,s =1 ,...,T (5)
5or, equivalently
(1 + α)
s−1 −α
s  
j=2
(1 + α)
s−j pj−1 −2ps −α
T−s  
i=1
ps+i (1 + α)
i−1 =0 ,s=1 ,...T.
It is easy to see that, the vector of prices (4) is the unique solution to the
above system whenever condition C.1 holds (notice that, pt (T) increases with
t; accordingly, p1 (T)=
1−(T−1)α
2−(T−1)α is positive if, and only if, C.1 is satisﬁed).
Now, it remains to check when the ﬁrst order necessary conditions identiﬁed
above are also suﬃcient for (4) being a solution to the maximization problem of
the monopolist. The Hessian matrix associated with the maximization problem
writes as
A(T)=−











2 αα (1 + α) ... α(α +1 )
T−2
α 2 α ... α(α +1 )
T−3
α(1 + α) α 2 ... α(α +1 )
T−4
... ... ... 2 α
α(α +1 )
T−2 α(α +1 )
T−3 α(α +1 )
T−4 α 2











The total proﬁt function Π(T;pT,...,p1) is strictly concave iﬀ,
det(A(T) )=( −1)
T ((T − 1)α − 2)(α +2 )
T−1 < 0,T even
or,
det(A(T) )=( −1)
T ((T − 1)α − 2)(α +2 )
T−1 > 0,T odd
or, equivalently
α<
2
T − 1
. (C.2)
This condition is trivially satisﬁed when α satisﬁes C.1 and it also guarantees
the uniqueness of the solution to the maximization problem.
To illustrate the above, the following table represents the sequence of optimal
prices corresponding to various values of the horizon T.
6T =2 1−α
2−α
1
2−α
T =3 1−2α
2−2α
1−α
2−2α
1
2−2α
T =4 1−3α
2−3α
1−2α
2−3α
1−α
2−3α
1
2−3α
... ... ... ... ...
T
1−(T−1)α
2−(T−1)α
1−(T−2)α
2−(T−1)α
1−(T−3)α
2−(T−1)α ... 1
2−(T−1)α
It is interesting to discuss brieﬂy how this solution depends on the main
ingredients of the model, namely, the time horizon T and the network intensity
parameter α. In order to perform the desired comparative statics we easily
compute the value of demand Dt, t =1 ,...,T, at optimal prices pt (T),...,p1 (T),
namely
Dt (pt (T),...,p1 (T)) =
1
2 − (T − 1)α
.
First notice that the value of each demand at period t evaluated at optimal
prices is smaller than 1. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that this value is constant, given
the horizon T. Finally, it is increasing with the horizon T and decreasing with
α.
The period t-proﬁts at the optimal solution πt (T) obtain as
πt (T)=pt (T) · Dt (pt (T),...,p1 (T))
=
1 − (T − t)α
(2 − (T − 1)α)
2.
Therefore, the per-period proﬁts πt (T) are increasing over time and also in-
creasing with the network intensity α (under C.1).
Total proﬁts evaluated at optimal prices, given the horizon T, obtain as
Π(T,pt (T),...,p1 (T)) =
T  
t=1
πt (T)=
T
2(2− (T − 1)α)
.
An immediate conclusion is that total proﬁts are an increasing function of
the horizon, as well as of the network intensity α.
74 “Strong” network intensity
By “strong network intensity” , we mean that condition C.1 is violated. First,
let us assume that
1
T − 1
≤ α ≤
2
T − 1
. (C.3)
As shown above, total proﬁts are also strictly concave in this domain, but some,
or all, components of the vector
 
pt (T)=
1−(T−t)α
2−(T−1)α
 T
t=1
must be equal to 0: all
prices are to be nonnegative. When α increases beyond the value 1
T−1,the ﬁrst
component of this vector to become smaller or equal to 0 at (4)is p1(T). Then,
how to characterize the optimal path of prices for p2(T),p 3(T),...,pT(T)?
Proposition 2 Under C.3, the set of values given by
p1(T) = 0 (6)
pt (T)=( t − 1)α, t =2 ,...,T
constitutes the unique solution to the monopolist’s proﬁt maximization problem.
Proof. First, notice that the domain of values for which p1(T)=
1−(T−1)α
2−(T−1)α ≤ 0,
namely,
 
α : 1
T−1 <α< 2
T−1
 
, strictly includes the domain for which p1(T +
1) ≤ 0. Consequently, the strongest condition for having p1(T) = 0 obtains for
the horizon T = 2 so that, whatever the value of the horizon T ≥ 2, we must
have p1(T)=0 . We shall now prove the proposition by induction. Consider
ﬁrst T =2 . Then, the second and third period demands are equal to:
D2(p2,p 1)=1 − p2 + α,
D3(p3,p2,p 1)=1 − p3 + α(1 − p2 + α).
We show that, under condition C.3, the optimal second period price p2(2) is
equal to α. Total proﬁt Π(2,p 2,0) is then equal to 1 + p2 (1 − p2 + α). The
ﬁrst-order condition writes as
1 − 2p2 + α =0 ,
8which is satisﬁed for p2 = 1+α
2 . Substituting this value in D2(p2,p 1),we see
that D2 = 1+α
2 , which exceeds 1, given that, by condition C.3, we have α>1.
Accordingly, this value should be discarded as a solution to the maximization
problem, and the optimal solution obtains at the highest value for p2 keeping
the demand smaller than 1, namely, p2 = p2 (2) = α.
Finally we must show that, if the path of prices (0,α,2α,...(T − 2)α)i s
optimal up to T − 1, then the optimal price path up to T is given by the
sequence (0,α,2α,...(T − 1)α). So, assume that (0,α,2α,...(T − 2)α) is the
optimal sequence of prices when the horizon is T − 1. The demand function
DT then writes as 1 − pT + α(T − 1), with corresponding total proﬁts equal to
pT (1 − pT + α(T − 1)).The ﬁrst order condition writes as
1 − 2pT + α(T − 1) = 0,
which is satisﬁed for pT =
1+α(T−1)
2 . Substituting this value in DT, we see
that, by condition C.3 (α ≥ 1
T−1), the corresponding demand exceeds the value
1,which is not admissible. Then, pT(T)=α(T − 1), which is the price that
corresponds to demand DT =1 .
Now, consider the case in which condition
α>
2
T − 1
(C.4)
holds. Then, the total proﬁt function is no longer concave, but convex. Accord-
ingly, the solution to the monopolist’s problem occurs at the boundary of the ad-
missible domain of prices, namely {(p1,...,pT):0≤ Dt (pt,...,p1) ≤ 1,t=1 ,...,T}.
In what follows we show:
Proposition 3 Under C.4, the set of values given by
p1(T) = 0 (7)
pt (T)=( t − 1)α, t =2 ,...,T
constitutes the unique solution to the monopolist’s proﬁt maximization problem.
9Proof. Suppose ﬁrst that T = 2 and that C.4 is satisﬁed, namely, α ≥ 1
2. Then,
the total proﬁt function of the monopolist writes as:
Π(2,p 2,p 1)=p1 (1 − p1)+p2 (1 − p2 + α(1 − p1))
which is a convex function in p1 and p2. The optimal solution must lie on the
boundary, namely, p1 = 0 and p2 = α, the prices for which both demands are
equal to 1. Then proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 2, it is easy to show
that the sequence of prices 0,α,...,(T − 1)α constitutes the optimal monopoly
solution when C.4 holds.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis is developed along the values of two major parameters, namely,
the network intensity and the horizon length, which are related to each other by
conditions C.1 to C.4. When the network intensity and the horizon length meet
condition C.1, the market is never saturated: given the weakness of network
intensity, the horizon is not suﬃciently far for the monopolist to cover the
market and keep it covered for the remaining periods. When conditions C.2
and C.3 are fulﬁlled, namely, when network intensity is suﬃciently strong, the
monopolist is induced to saturate the market from the very beginning, and
keep it covered for all subsequent periods. Notice that when the horizon length
tends to inﬁnity, the domain of network intensity values to which corresponds
an interior solution, i.e. in which zero pricing is not practised, tends to a set of
measure zero. Thus we conclude that, when the horizon is suﬃciently remote,
zero pricing in the starting period should be the rule.
The vector of prices identiﬁed in the optimal policies above corresponds to a
solution in which the monopolist is not allowed to revise his strategy. However,
we have checked that the solution would not be altered if this revision would
be allowed. This property follows from the fact that consumers arrive in the
market by successive waves and cannot delay consumption, which implies that
they cannot arbitrate between periods when making their purchase decisions.
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